Hyland OnBase Cross Site Request Forgery ≈ Packet Storm – Digitalmunition




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Published on September 8th, 2020 📆 | 4775 Views ⚑

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Hyland OnBase Cross Site Request Forgery ≈ Packet Storm

CVSSv3.1 Score
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AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N

Vendor
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Hyland Software – (https://www.hyland.com/en/ and https://www.onbase.com/en/)

Product
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Hyland OnBase
All derivatives based on OnBase

Versions Affected
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All versions up to and prior to OnBase Foundation EP1 (tested: 19.8.9.1000) and OnBase 18 (tested: 18.0.0.32). OnBase Foundation EP2 and OnBase Foundation EP3 were not available to test, but Hyland’s response indicates that they are not likely to have fixed the vulnerability.

Credit
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Adaptive Security Consulting

Vulnerability Summary
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Hyland OnBase’s web client allows cross-site request forgery on the login page allowing an attacker to authenticate a user utilizing known credentials, allowing the attacker to gather data about the user, perform spoofing, and other activities.

Technical Details
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Hyland OnBase’s web login process fails to utilize a CSRF token, allowing an attacker to authenticate a victim utilizing attacker-known credentials (such as the default credentials “manager:wstinol” and “hsi:wstinol”) when not using federated authentication. Once authenticated, the victim would be performing actions on-behalf of the attacker or the attacker can leverage the XSSi vulnerabilities to extract data from OnBase remotely, bypassing cross origin policies.

Solution
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Unfortunately, attempts to notify Hyland of the vulnerabilities have been rebuffed as not being something that they have to fix since fixing vulnerabilities, according to the Director of Application Security, is “creating custom code” and no known fix is in place. It is recommended that users utilize federated authentication or, failing that, strong credential management processes to mitigate the risk of exploitation, and ensure that all default credentials are changed.

Timeline
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07 May 2019 – Adaptive Security Consulting discovered a series of vulnerabilities in medical records management and search applications being considered by our client
15 May 2019 – The client was provided with the results of the assessment, including POCs for a number of high and critical vulnerabilities
12 July 2019 – Client asked for more information and demonstrations
01 October 2019 – Client asked to test latest version of Hyland software
15 October 2019 – Client was informed that EP1 contained many of the same vulnerabilities
March 2020 – Client contacted Hyland and spoke with the Director of Application Security who said that fixing vulnerabilities was “writing custom code” and that Hyland “doesn’t write custom code”
21 April 2020 – Adaptive Security Consulting attempted to contact Hyland’s Application Security Team via email on behalf of client, but attempts were ignored

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