Published on September 9th, 2020 📆 | 6898 Views ⚑0
Hyland OnBase Hardcoded Secrets ≈ Packet Storm
Hyland Software – (https://www.hyland.com/en/ and https://www.onbase.com/en/)
All derivatives based on OnBase
All versions up to and prior to OnBase Foundation EP1 (tested: 188.8.131.520) and OnBase 18 (tested: 184.108.40.206). OnBase Foundation EP2 and OnBase Foundation EP3 were not available to test, but Hyland’s response indicates that they are not likely to have fixed the vulnerabilities.
Adaptive Security Consulting
Hyland OnBase contains a number of hardcoded key materials, such as constant, hardcoded AES CBC initialization vectors and hardcoded PKI certificates.
Decompilation of the OnBase binaries found several hardcoded PKI certificates and AES CBC IVs. The AES CBC IVs were often set to an array of 0s and completely constant across all messages. Attackers can use these hardcoded certificates, which included the pubic and private keys, to encrypt and decrypt data. The use of hardcoded, non-changing CBC IV makes it easier for an attacker to decrypt the ciphertext.
The IVs examined did not appear to change with the version of OnBase. Some certificates changed between the two versions examined. The binaries did not indicate that the keys or certificates varied from installation-to-installation.
Unfortunately, attempts to notify Hyland of the vulnerabilities have been rebuffed as not being something that they have to fix since fixing vulnerabilities, according to the Director of Application Security, is “creating custom code” and no known fix is in place.
07 May 2019 – Adaptive Security Consulting discovered a series of vulnerabilities in medical records management and
search applications being considered by our client
15 May 2019 – The client was provided with the results of the assessment, including POCs for a number of high and
12 July 2019 – Client asked for more information and demonstrations
01 October 2019 – Client asked to test latest version of Hyland software
15 October 2019 – Client was informed that EP1 contained many of the same vulnerabilities
March 2020 – Client contacted Hyland and spoke with the Director of Application Security who said that fixing vulnerabilities was “writing custom code” and that Hyland “doesn’t write custom code”
21 April 2020 – Adaptive Security Consulting attempted to contact Hyland’s Application Security Team via email on behalf of client, but attempts were ignored