Published on September 8th, 2020 📆 | 6656 Views ⚑0
Hyland OnBase Path Traversal ≈ Packet Storm
Hyland Software – (https://www.hyland.com/en/ and https://www.onbase.com/en/)
All derivatives based on OnBase
All versions up to and prior to OnBase Foundation EP1 (tested: 220.127.116.110) and OnBase 18 (tested: 18.104.22.168). OnBase Foundation EP2 and OnBase Foundation EP3 were not available to test, but Hyland’s response indicates that they are not likely to have fixed the vulnerabilities.
Adaptive Security Consulting
The Hyland OnBase server is vulnerable to path traversal allowing attackers to read and write to arbitrary files on the server.
The Hyland OnBase server fails to properly sanitize and escape user input allowing path traversal on the OnBase server. Multiple methods were found that directly concatinate user input into local file system calls without validation. Two separate types exist, read-only and write or append-only, allowing remote attackers who send SOAP calls directly to vulnerable methods using vulnerable parameters (typically “FileName”).
Seven read-only instances and twelve write or append-only instances were found allowing the attacker to read configuration data and arbitrary files across the server and append, create, and write to arbitrary files on the server, including uploading malicious DLLs and backdoors.
Unfortunately, attempts to notify Hyland of the vulnerabilities have been rebuffed as not being something that they have to fix since fixing vulnerabilities, according to the Director of Application Security, is “creating custom code” and no known fix is in place. Run the Hyland OnBase server in a restricted environment under a service account that can only access those files required to operate. Restrict the ability of the service account to write to files to the greatest extent possible.
07 May 2019 – Adaptive Security Consulting discovered a series of vulnerabilities in medical records management and
search applications being considered by our client
15 May 2019 – The client was provided with the results of the assessment, including POCs for a number of high and critical vulnerabilities
12 July 2019 – Client asked for more information and demonstrations
01 October 2019 – Client asked to test latest version of Hyland software
15 October 2019 – Client was informed that EP1 contained many of the same vulnerabilities
March 2020 – Client contacted Hyland and spoke with the Director of Application Security who said that fixing vulnerabilities was “writing custom code” and that Hyland “doesn’t write custom code”
21 April 2020 – Adaptive Security Consulting attempted to contact Hyland’s Application Security Team via email on behalf of client, but attempts were ignored